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This paper takes up the question of transparency in electronically enabled
elections (e-voting). The principle of transparency is central to electoral
governance as it provides means for electoral stakeholders to observe and
ensure the integrity of an election. However, the issue of transparency in
the field of e-voting has been proved to be difficult to tackle practically
as well as analytically. In this paper we introduce the notion of ‘frames
of transparency’ and deploy it to conduct a comparative analysis of three
e-vote counting ceremonies in Norway, Estonia and Australia. We ask the
question of how transparency is framed during these ceremonies, that is what
features of the electronic votes counting process are made visible and what
others are omitted. Our analysis reveals that e-voting ceremonies emphasizes
bureaucratic and technocratic frames of transparency, while the democratic
frame is the most difficult to uphold.
1 Introduction
Today, electoral management bodies (EMBs) around the world increasingly use informa-
tion and communication technologies to support the administration of elections (OSCE,
2013a). These technologies range from the use of basic tools such as word processing
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and spreadsheets to more complex data processing tools such as database management
systems, optical scanners and Internet voting. Electoral technologies provide EMBs with
new capabilities, but also pose democratic challenges. Contrary to the conventional pens
and paper, the inner workings of computers are not visible to the ‘naked eye’ (OSCE,
2013a). The inherent opacity of e-voting systems is problematic since confidence in the
result of an election is based on the premise that all aspects of an election should be
transparent. Transparency is critical for the public examination and control of elections
which is fundamental in democratic elections.
During the last decade, the election community has struggled to formulate policies to
guide national efforts to digitalize electoral processes. The notion of transparency should
be instrumental in this. Different mechanisms have been devised to improve electoral
transparency in e-voting systems such as testing, auditing and certification of the voting
technologies. However, we argue that understanding transparency is critical to deal with
the broad democratic challenges involved in e-voting. Of special interest to us are in
this regard e-vote counting ceremonies, such as those that were organized in Norway,
Estonia and Australia designed to make some aspects of the decryption and counting of
e-votes visible to a public.
In this paper we first examine how e-voting systems are challenging electoral trans-
parency by identifying three forms of opacity. We do this by looking into the resources
about e-voting produced by international election observation organizations and inter-
governmental organizations such as the Council of Europe. In order to investigate
transparency further we offer three distinct ways of analyzing transparency, which we
conceptualize under the notion of frames of transparency: (1) bureaucratic framing:
transparency as rule-governed elections; (2) technocratic framing: transparency that
stems from the verification of technical aspects of e-voting systems; and (3) democratic
framing: transparency stemming from the direct observation of electoral activities and
public involvement. Based on this typology we analyze, compare and discuss three
e-votes counting ceremonies held in Norway, Estonia and Australia.
2 E-Voting and the Problem of Opacity
The increasing use of electronic voting technologies in elections is recognized by the
international election observation community as a new major challenge facing electoral
transparency (The Carter Center, 2007). In any e-voting system, there is an inherent
tension between the ability to convince the public about the integrity of the election
while protecting the secrecy of the vote. How can the public and election observers
gain confidence in the outcome of the election when steps such as testing, set-up of the
system, conduct of voting, counting or destruction of the data are black-boxed? Our
review of the literature of the international election observation community reveals that
e-voting systems pose, in their views, three main problems to electoral transparency: (1)
the problem of observability; (2) the problem of understandability; and (3) the problem
of corporate secrecy.
First, the obvious issue is that e-voting systems are not easily observed with the
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naked eye of an observer. This is what we call the problem of observability. The paper
ballot system, which consists of people, pens and paper, is transparent as in paper-based
systems, election observers may watch ballots being issued, voters placing their ballots
in the ballot box and ballots being counted. In comparison, electronic voting systems
include numerous elements that are not directly observable. The counting of ballots,
just to give an example, is not anymore conducted manually by hundreds of citizens
volunteers, which are in principle, easily observable by the eye of an observer, but by a
group of a few technical experts operating computers.
Beyond ‘visibility’ matters, another challenge to electoral transparency stems from the
complexity introduced by e-voting systems and the capacity of the observer to under-
stand the functioning of the system. This is what we call the problem of understandabil-
ity. Given that the voting channel is based on computer technologies, electronic voting
technologies are often considered ‘black boxes’ which non specialist observers are neither
able to observe nor understand the inner workings of. Instead, the inherent complexities
can only be understood (and often only in part) by few experts, which means that the
integrity of the electoral process relies largely on the expertise and experience of this
small group in contrast to thousands of poll workers (International IDEA, 2012). There
is also mention of a widening gap between the knowledge of the technicians who run
the election and that of the electorate and political parties (The Carter Center, 2007).
The gap, it is feared, can grow so wide that it risks to erode the general public capacity
to lodge complaints or legal challenges. In the case of the counting of e-votes, only a
very few people observing such a process understand the technical aspects of cleansing,
mixing and decrypting an electronic ballot box.
Finally, proprietary concerns are also challenging electoral transparency. Trade se-
crets, proprietary code and non-disclosure agreements are at odds with the idea of trans-
parent elections. IT vendors intentionally make their solutions proprietary arguing for
the need to protect their trade secrets in order to keep their competitive advantage (Mau-
rer and Barrat, 2015). The problem of propriety concerns not so much the counting stage
of an e-enabled election, but it is imminently problematic during the testing stage where
expert observers are either prevented to access the e-voting system in order to assess it
or are submitted to non-disclosure agreements, which forbid them to make the results of
their investigation publicly available. The reason why many countries admit proprietary
systems in the electoral process is due to the legal framework not explicitly ruling this
out. A notable exception is Germany, where the Supreme Court has ruled an election
law unconstitutional because it did not guarantee sufficient provisions to keep procured
technologies transparent.
These different forms of opacity introduced by e-voting systems raise questions such as:
What can and should be visible in e-voting systems? What kind of access to the e-voting
processes is needed by observers? How can one make transparent the workings of e-
voting systems where the processes of counting and tabulation are invisible? What steps
are actually taken by electoral management bodies to promote transparency? How do
experts verify the system and communicate the results to the public? How can the public
be involved in the electoral process in a meaningful way? We see the emergence of e-
vote counting ceremonies as a partial answer to these questions. In the following section,
3
we introduce our approach for investigating electoral transparency in the ceremonies by
introducing the notion of ‘frames of transparency’.
3 Investigating Electoral Transparency
Despite its omnipresence across the election literature, there is no conceptual framework
that describes how electoral transparency is achieved. What we find instead is a set
of heterogenous mechanisms, measures, recommendations and best practices promoting
electoral transparency. For example, the Council of Europe suggests that transparency
is “the concept of determining how and why information is conveyed through various
means” (Council of Europe, 2011). For the International Foundation for Electoral Sys-
tems (IFES), electoral transparency is “the term for a clear and open process, which
is understandable and accountable to the electorate” (Kaplan, 2002). These examples
reveal how transparency is often casually defined leaving much left to an assumed tacit
understanding.
No doubt transparency is an extremely difficult notion to tackle practically as well
as analytically. In our view transparency is not an object that can be ‘looked at’ and
examined. Rather, it is a dynamic and instrumental notion in the name of which selected
aspects of the electoral process are made visible in order to uphold trust in the integrity
of the results. That being said, we believe that it is possible by synthesizing election
observation sources to investigate at a conceptual level attempts to make certain aspects
of an election transparent. Our goal is to make explicit common tendencies in the use of
the word transparency in the election community and to suggest three different ways of
understanding it. To this end, we develop a framework that conceptualizes transparency
as a practical achievement by introducing the notion of frames of transparency.
In order to provide a view of transparency that emphasizes its democratic potentials,
we propose the notion of ‘frames of transparency’. The notion of frames is an empirically
useful concept to describe how concerns about electoral transparency are dealt with by
different means. According to a well-known definition, the notion of ‘frame’ refers to
‘ideas’ and ‘values’ that help to ‘select some aspects of a perceived reality and make
them more salient in a communicating context’ (Entman, 1993). In framing electoral
transparency, one selects some features of the electoral process to make them more
noticeable, meaningful or memorable while omitting some others. We argue that the
notion of framing offers a way to describe the democratic aspects of electoral events
such as the e-vote counting ceremony.
Electoral transparency is the effect of the interaction between different aspects of an
election and the observer’s capacity to observe and understand them. A feature of the
electoral process emphasized in a context such as the e-vote counting ceremonies can be
difficult for observers to notice, interpret, or remember because of their pre-existing (or
lack thereof) knowledge about the procedures and technical aspects of e-voting systems.
For instance, as we will see below, the numerous technical aspects emphasized during the
e-voting ceremonies were, to some extent, only transparent for a small group of experts.
By reviewing sources from election observation organisations and intergovernmental
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bodies, we propose three ways of framing transparency. First, the bureaucratic frame of
transparency emphasizes the importance of designing clear rules and procedures govern-
ing the electoral process. Second, the technocratic frame of transparency emphasizes the
importance of making the inner workings of an e-voting system knowable through obser-
vations, tests, audits and certifications. Finally, the democratic frame of transparency
emphasizes the importance of giving direct access to electoral activities to a wide range
of election stakeholders (beyond civil servants and technical experts), but in particular
to the citizens, scrutineers, parties, not only to directly observe electoral activities, but
also to actively take part in them. Both the bureaucratic and the technocratic framing
are important from a democratic point of view, of course. They are constitutive in how
contemporary governance takes place in most countries. They do not, however, high-
light how citizens and in the case of voters more explicitly participate in the governance
process, an aspect that is particularly important in democratic elections.
3.1 Bureaucratic frame: Transparency as rule-governed electoral process
One frame of transparency emerging from the election literature is that the state shall be
open about the rules and procedures governing the electoral process. According to the
OSCE, “[t]he principle of transparency requires that the election be carried out accord-
ing to due process of the law, and according to legal ground rules that are established in
an inclusive and open manner” (OSCE, 1999). Attempts to strengthen electoral gover-
nance have strongly focused on the design of electoral systems based on accessible and
well defined rules, see e.g. (Massicotte et al., 2004; Norris, 2004). In fact, governance ac-
cording to fixed and published rules is perhaps the most common frame of transparency,
which requires that information and procedures that are accessible to the public (Hood
and Heald, 2006).
This frame of transparency comprises typical electoral procedures such as the noti-
fication of elections, registration procedures, nomination of candidates, the voting pro-
cedure, publishing and explaining the procedures for complaints about the electoral
process (Council of Europe, 2011), but also procedures that are a direct result of us-
ing e-voting systems. The OSCE asks its member states, for instance, to consider if
their respective legal framework takes into account the implications of new technolo-
gies, including adequate provision for access of observers, system audits, as well as the
possibility for recounts, mandatory audits of results and legal challenges to election re-
sults (OSCE, 2013a). Along similar lines, International IDEA insists that rules and
procedures governing the procurement process of e-voting systems are essential to avoid
the impression that the process appears hijacked by vendors (International IDEA, 2012).
The criteria used for selecting any e-voting system should be made clear and publicly
available in advance. The Council of Europe (CoE) also recommends the development
of procedures defining which stakeholders shall have access to what and when (Council
of Europe, 2011).
Transparency of the different electoral procedures is said to contribute to the voters’
knowledge and understanding, thereby generating trust and confidence among the gen-
eral public (Council of Europe, 2010). The notion of a neutral, independent process
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upholds one version of electoral governance that is transparent.
3.2 Technocratic frame: Transparency as control of technical aspects
A second frame of transparency, which emerged from the introduction of e-voting sys-
tems, aims to make the internal workings of the systems used within an election know-
able. As we have seen, e-voting systems pose special challenges to observers, due to the
different levels of opacity of the technical components.
This frame of transparency includes mechanisms such as audits, impartial and indepen-
dent certification, and testing, which are all said to promote electoral transparency (The
Carter Center, 2007). The CoE suggests, for instance, electoral management bodies to
provide observers with an opportunity “to have access to relevant software information,
to see physical and electronic safety measures for servers, to inspect and test certified
devices, to have access to and test sites and information provided for remote e-voting,
and to observe cast electronic votes entering the electronic ballot box and that votes are
being counted” (Council of Europe, 2004). It is also suggested that the software used in
e-voting systems should be subject to impartial inspection by an independant body (The
Carter Center, 2007). The CoE advises its member states to audit the voting software
source code, the configuration as well as all hardware and software components of the
e-voting system by an independent organization (Council of Europe, 2011).
It is worth mentioning that these mechanisms of transparency transfer the responsibil-
ity of overseeing the electoral process from the general public to a community of experts,
see e.g. (Barrat, 2012). If permitted by the contract, election commissions often make
the findings of third-party audits available, we note, however, that alongside the public
is left with only diminished abilities to challenge any part of the electoral process.
3.3 Democratic frame: Transparency as observation and participation in
electoral activities
A third frame of transparency advocated by the election community is emphasizing di-
rectly observable electoral activities. This is illustrated for example in the second part of
the OSCE’s definition of transparency, which emphasizes this dimension: “A transparent
process limits the possibility for election fraud, and thus the vote count should be visible
and verifiable from the level of the polling station, to any intermediate levels of the
election administration, and finally to the national election authority” (OSCE, 1999).
In conventional elections, numerous arrangements emphasize transparency including the
invitation for anyone to become an election official. In many western countries, it is com-
mon practice to allow teams consisting of delegates with different political backgrounds
to inspect and control the electoral processes.
One aspect of this framing promotes transparency as the direct observation of elec-
toral activities. The CoE suggests that its member states should ease the presence of
observers in polling stations and/or data transfer and data processing sites (Council
of Europe, 2011). The OSCE observes that not all aspects of e-voting systems can be
directly observed. However, a number of activities can be open to observers, such as
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the deployment, setup and modification of the system by administrators and vendors,
but also the activities of certification, testing, and audit authorities (OSCE, 2013a).
Opening decision-making to observers is considered to contribute to electoral trans-
parency (Council of Europe, 2010). The e-vote counting ceremonies analyzed below are
also contributing to this form of transparency.
That being said, we would like to suggest that the involvement of the public in elec-
toral activities should also be included in the democratic framing of transparency. Our
argument here is that transparency is not solely achieved by giving the citizens the right
to observe election processes, but also by giving them the right to participate in them.
The distributed counting in paper-based elections, for example, relies on the participa-
tion of people, their collaboration and their ability to control one another. This creates
electoral transparency.
Also, from a democratic perspective, the main weakness of any e-voting system con-
sists in the difficulty for average citizens to conduct their own verification (Barrat, 2012).
To answer this problem, the election community has been advocating the use of software
independent voting systems. “A voting system is software-independent if an undetected
change or error in its software cannot cause an undetectable change or error in an
election outcome” (Rivest, 2008). One way to achieve software independence is via a
voter-verified paper audit trail, that enables the voter to ensure that his or her intent
was correctly recorded. The CoE has integrated software independence in its own rec-
ommendation requiring that e-voting machines shall produce a physical interpretation
of the vote in order for the voter to verify its correctness, for the auditor to conduct,
for example, a risk-limiting audit (Council of Europe, 2011; Stark, 2010). An e-voting
system can be end-to-end verifiable, which means that it produces enough evidence for
anyone to participate in checking this evidence for achieving high levels of confidence
that the overall result of the election is correct.
4 Case Studies
In the case of e-enabled elections where the counting of votes is impossible to observe
by conventional means, we see e-vote counting ceremonies as emergent communication
events in the electoral cycle created by electoral management bodies to mitigate the
opacity introduced by e-voting systems. An e-vote counting ceremony is a public event,
generally performed in front of an audience, witnessing and following the process by
which electronic votes are officially decrypted, counted and the election results are ulti-
mately published. This event is meant to make the decryption and counting processes
visible and generate trust about the integrity of the election result.
Even though the list of countries having engaged in electronic elections has in general
been increasing, not all countries have offered such processes as a public event. To our
knowledge, only three countries have done so: Norway in 2011 and in its last parliamen-
tary election in 2013, Estonia from 2007, and the State of Victoria, in Australia, in its
last election in 2015. The nature of such an event, though, differs from country to coun-
try, and even from election to election. Some of these ceremonies have been addressed
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to a mixed public, while some others were more addressed to experts. In some cases, the
event was made available online or even lived streamed, while some others could only
be witnessed by people being present and/or personally invited to the event. Here we
analyze the three e-vote counting ceremonies, held in Norway, 2013, State of Victoria
2014, and Estonia, 2015, and we report our observations regarding how the different
ceremonies are framing electoral transparency.
4.1 Decryption and Counting Ceremony in Norway 2013
The Decryption and Counting Ceremony of the Norwegian Internet voting pilot took
place on election day September 9th, 2013 in an auditorium in the Ministry, two hours
before the election closed. The audience consisted of election observers from many
different countries who had attended a seminar on the Norwegian electoral process held
in the same building on the 8-9th of September, and included representatives from
the OSCE, Carter Center, representatives of various election commissions, scientists,
vendors, and researchers. The ceremony was simultaneously translated into English
and, just as importantly, open for all citizens. The event was also broadcast on the
Ministry’s homepage. The host, Christian Bull, head of security of the voting project,
explained the different aspects of internet elections and guided the audience through the
ceremony. The purpose of the ceremony was to decrypt and tally the electronic ballot
box that had been retrieved from the central database server some time before the event,
in the presence of the verification team and the observers.
4.1.1 Bureaucratic framing of transparency
The Norwegian Election Act allows electoral pilot projects. Based on the Council of
Europe’s recommendations, this pilot was governed by regulations issued by the Ministry.
Different from the September 2009 pilot, this time an Internet Election Committee (IEC)
was appointed to ensure that the Internet voting pilot was conducted in accordance with
these regulations in a manner that was open and the voters could trust (Ministry of Local
Government and Regional Development, Norway, 2013). The IEC was an independent
body that was tasked to supervise the preparation, verification and approval of the
results. They also had the authority to suspend or cancel the pilot in case of irregularities.
The IEC consisted of nine members covering technical and political competences as well
as representatives of the municipalities involved in the pilot. The OSCE report puts an
emphasis on this by recommending that more rules and procedures on how people are
elected to the IEC are made explicit in order to avoid conflict of interest and secure
independence of the team (OSCE, 2013b). Another task of the IEC was to appoint an
independent verification team to check the evidence generated by the decryption and
counting process (OSCE, 2013b). The creation of the IEC and the legal framework
anchor the pilot within the bureaucratic framing. The legal framework was described in
detail during the workshop preceding the ceremony.
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4.1.2 Technocratic framing of transparency
The organizers of the Norwegian e-vote counting ceremony spared no cost to make the
decryption and counting visible and transparent from a technical point of view. Two
assistants were executing the three phases (cleansing, mixing and e-counting) using one
dedicated laptop each, that were placed on a large table on the auditorium stage. In
addition, three overhead screens displayed various aspects of the process: one screen
was showing a diagram giving an overview of the technical setup; a second one (the
technical screen) was showing the Linux prompt where the assistants were typing various
commands; and a third one described the respective phases of the process and depicted
the command that had to be executed. Furthermore, a safety deposit box that contained
a second, smaller safety deposit box that in turn contained the USB key with the election
data was placed in one corner of the room while a blender was placed in another corner.
This blender would be used to destroy USB sticks containing information that would
otherwise link the voter to his or her vote.
During the ceremony, the organizers deliberately gave the audience a glimpse into the
inner workings of the decryption and counting process like, for instance, which folders
were accessed, what their content was, etc.
The organizers also made great efforts to convince the audience that the data weren’t
tampered with through the different phases of the ceremony. To make visible that
the three laptops were air-gapped, the organizers color-coded the cables connecting the
laptops to the different servers and the transfer of data from one laptop (phase) to
the next one, was always done by means of USB sticks. These USB sticks were taken
from the inner safety deposit box, for which the verifier team held the physical key.
Before each use, the organizers also demonstrated that the memory sticks were new
by showing on one screen their content, so that everyone could check that they were
empty. Furthermore, in order to show that the cleansed ballot box and the mixed ballot
box remained unchanged when transferred from one phase to the other, and no process
injected new votes into the ballot box, a well-known cryptographic tool known as hash
function was used. The output of a hash function is unique (at least for our purposes
it may be considered as such), thus it was used here to prove the equality of two files
located in different machines. In the context of the ceremony, the hash value of the file to
be transferred was shown both before being copied to the memory stick, and after being
copied to the next machine. This enabled the verifier team, as well as anyone among
the audience, to take a picture of the first hash value and compare it to the second one
for equality. Because of the sensitive nature of the data contained in the memory sticks
used between the cleansing and the mixing and between the mixing and the e-counting
phases, as well as to illustrate that the ballots in these memory sticks should never be
recovered, these memory sticks were immediately destroyed in the blender after use.
Once the mixing phase was completed, the verifier team received two USB sticks
containing, respectively, the mixed ballot box and the zero-knowledge proofs generated
during the mixing phase, to check that the mixing had been conducted correctly. Later
on, the host declared that the verifiers had informed him that their checking was suc-
cessful.
9
Prior to the election, the organizers created a private election key, shares of which
were given to each IEC member on a smartcard. Six out of the nine shares were needed
to reconstruct the key necessary to decrypt the e-votes (Kommunal og Regionaldepar-
tamentet, 2013). During the counting phase, the host selected those six IEC members
at random, and once the private election key was retrieved, they decrypted the e-votes
and thus obtained the election results. These results were then copied to a USB stick,
which would be transferred to the election information system (EVA) after the ceremony.
Finally, the verifier team received the USB sticks containing the mixed ballot box and
the zero-knowledge proofs generated in the e-counting phase, to check the decryption.
4.1.3 Democratic framing of transparency
The Norwegian e-vote counting ceremony was an attempt to mitigate the inherent opac-
ity introduced by e-voting systems also by making public the counting of e-votes. Mech-
anisms were deployed in order to involve a broad set of electoral stakeholders in the
counting stage of the Internet voting process, thus emphasizing the democratic framing
of transparency. The ceremony itself can be understood as a transparency mechanism
affording the public to ‘directly’ observe the counting of e-votes. But more than that,
the formation of the IEC, which was created having plurality in mind by delegating
responsibilities between politicians, independent experts and local administrations, re-
flected the ideal of a direct participation in the electoral process. During the ceremony,
the host involved the audience to determine the order at random in which the members
of the IEC would present their USB keys to reconstruct the private election key. The
live broadcast of the event on the Internet and its publication afterwards is another such
mechanism. During the ceremony, media entered the room to broadcast live the event
on national news.
4.2 E-vote counting ceremony in Estonia 2015
Estonia was one of the first countries to offer Internet voting as an alternative voting
channel to all eligible voters in national elections. The election of 2015 was their third
parliamentary election. The e-vote counting ceremony took place on the evening of
election day, 1st March 2015 in the conference hall of the parliament, the Toompea
Castle, in Tallinn. The audience was composed of, and in no particular order, the media,
political parties representatives, researchers, members of foreign electoral management
bodies, representants from other IT vendors and domestic and international observers
including an Election Expert Team from the OSCE consisting of three experts. The
ceremony was held in Estonian and simultaneously translated into English.
4.2.1 Bureaucratic framing of transparency
In Estonia, the conduct of parliamentary elections is regulated by the 1992 Constitu-
tion and the 2002 Riigikogu Election Act. In 2012, following the recommendation of the
OSCE, a number of amendments were introduced to the Election Act to further regulate
and consolidate aspects of Internet voting (OSCE, 2015). One amendment of interest to
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our analysis regulates the formation of the Electronic Voting Committee (EVC), under
the auspices of the National Electoral Committee (NEC). This committee is responsible
of organizing Internet voting, verifying the electronic voting results and has the author-
ity to suspend or cancel the Internet election in case of irregularities. The committee
was composed of seven members appointed by the NEC from among experts in relevant
technical disciplines, such as Internet security, computer programming, and administra-
tion of servers (OSCE, 2015). Another amendment made to the Election Act in 2012
describes in great detail the procedures governing the counts of electronic ballots, and
by extension the sequence of events taking place during the e-vote counting ceremony.
The provision specifies, among other things, that the EVC shall verify the results of
e-voting on election day after 7 p.m.; that at least one half of the members of the EVC
and the NEC shall be present at the counting of votes; that the NEC shall open the
e-votes using the private election key; that the counting of e-votes shall be public; that
the voting results shall not be disclosed before 8 p.m. and; that the chairman of the EVC
shall enter the voting results in the election information system immediately (Riigikogu
Election Act, chapter 9, paragraph 60: Counting of votes cast using electronic means).
These different amendments to the Election Act regulating the counting ceremony are
essential to the bureaucratic framing of transparency. These rules, discussed and made
publicly available, are the legal/formal ‘backbone’ of the ceremony dictating its rhythm
and the sequence of the events that we observed. These rules were made explicitly visible
during the workshop held before the ceremony, but not during the ceremony itself.
4.2.2 Technocratic framing of transparency
The organizers of the Estonian ceremony put great emphasis on the technical aspects
of the counting of e-votes. The setup of the conference hall, for instance, was designed
to foreground and make visible the devices used during the Internet election and, to
some extent, their inner workings. On stage, there were two overhead screens and
three devices arranged on a long table: (1) the server containing the electronic ballot
box; (2) the server used to count the ballots and; (3) the hardware security module
(HSM) containing the private election key necessary to decrypt e-votes. The devices
were connected to a computer screen, a keyboard and a projector. While the central
overhead screen was showing explanatory slides accompanying the counting process, the
smaller screen, which we will call the technical screen, located to the lower right of the
main screen displayed a menu in Estonian from which a member of the EVC selected the
next action to be executed. It also displayed the commands executed on the servers and
their responses. Most of them were Linux commands, and as in Norway, no graphical
user interface was used.
Beyond the setup of the room, we noticed that the organizers paid special attention
to making visible and trustworthy the integrity and the secrecy of the e-votes while
they were being moved from one medium to another. For instance, when the organizers
transferred the encrypted votes from the server storing the ballots to the counting server,
they burned the data on a green CD and made its content (2 files) visible on the technical
screen. In addition, the organizers checked the integrity of the data by computing, as in
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Norway, a hash value for each file that demonstrated that the transfer did not corrupted
the files. The operator then transferred the encrypted e-votes to the counting server
connected to the HSM. In order to decrypt the votes, the EVC members needed to
unlock the HSM. The particular unlocking scheme used here required that at least four
of the seven EVC members presented their respective key shares to the HSM. The
four members of the EVC stepped forward, presented their shares to the HSM, and the
decryption process began. Note that this makes visible that it will take four or more EVC
members to collude in order to break the secrecy of the vote. The result of the decryption
process were burned onto a yellow CD, transferred to the election administration system,
and checked for integrity. The audience could follow the procedure on the main screen.
Lastly, the deputy chairman of the EVC displayed the final results of tallying all Internet
votes.
4.2.3 Democratic framing of transparency
The purpose of the ceremony was to make public the decryption and counting of the e-
votes as well as the publishing of the final results of the Internet elections. In the light of
the democratic framing, the ceremony itself can be seen as a singular event contributing
to the overall transparency of Internet elections by enabling multiple stakeholders to
observe ‘directly’ the decryption, counting and publishing of e-votes. The ceremony
was open to everyone who registered as an observer, local or international, who were
expected to participate in a seminar on the Estonian electoral system the day before.
The ceremony was neither broadcast nor published on the Internet afterwards. We
argue that the seminar contributed to a democratic framing of transparency. During the
ceremony however, there was very little interaction between the EVC and the audience.
4.3 Mixing and Decryption Ceremony in Victoria in Australia 2014
Our final case study is that of the decryption ceremony of the Victoria State Election on
November 30, 2014 that took place in the back office of the Victoria Electoral Commission
(VEC) at 530 Collins Street in downtown Melbourne. The ceremony was organized by
Craig Burton, the program manager of the vVote project, a voting system that was
custom-made for the elections in Victoria. Participation was by invitation only. Present
at the ceremony were mainly scientists, implementers, reviewers, deputy commissioner
and election officials but neither election observation missions nor scrutineers. Even
though some countries outside of Europe, as for instance the US, are members of OSCE,
Australia is not. Australia does in general not permit election observation by foreign
organizations. The ceremony was videotaped (by us and not the organizers), which is
available on Youtube.1
The goal of the ceremony was not as much to convince the audience that the results of
the mixing and decryption were correct, but more a demonstration about how the vVote
voting system works at all. In fact, the ceremony that we, the audience, experienced
was only a repetition of what took place behind closed door the night before at the
1https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I5GId7K-Zl8&feature=youtu.be
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same location. The vVote system is the custom-built kiosk-based voting solution that is
loosely based on Preˆt-a`-Voter (Ryan et al., 2009) and implemented by Steve Schneider
and his team at the University of Surrey. vVote’s hallmark characteristics is that it is
end-to-end voter verifiable, which means that each voter can check after the election, (1)
that their encrypted ballots were recorded as intended, (2) that the mixing of all ballots
was successful, (3) that all ballots were correctly decrypted, and (4) that the resulting
election result was correct. It is noteworthy to emphasize that the ceremony was held
as part of a binding pilot of limited scope. The VEC had authorized that vVote only be
used in selected polling stations in Victoria by people with disabilities and those with
special language needs and for all voters living abroad in London, United Kingdom.
Although the system was designed to handle a million votes, only 1121 ballots were
collected during the advance voting period, which was the only period during which the
system was authorized to be used. During the ceremony these 1121 e-votes were mixed,
decrypted, printed, and inserted into the manual count (Burton et al., 2015).
The ceremony took place in the office space adjacent to a server room of the VEC. Four
laptops, programmed to execute the mixing and decryption programs, and a desktop
computer, programmed to serve as the central node that would distribute the work
among the laptops and interpret the results, were placed next to each other on a desk.
The audience was in part sitting and in part standing in front of this desk. Burton
led the ceremony using simple instructional and rhetoric devices, such as ballot papers,
receipts, etc. to explain the process, how it is started, what was happening, and what
happened after the decryption. During the ceremony, the audience could follow the
individual steps, but at no time during the ceremony was the result made visible.
4.3.1 Bureaucratic framing of transparency
Only little can be said about the bureaucratic framing of transparency. The Electoral
Act 2002, No. 23 of 2002 Part 6A -Electronic Voting, paragraph 110E (2) f) requires
that “the computer program can produce a paper record of each vote cast using an
electronic ballot-paper to enable the counting of votes in the election.” Details of the
ceremony that surround the production of the paper record of each vote are not specified
in the legislation. This means, that the VEC was not obliged to hold such a ceremony
and thus not bound to any specific rules on how to organize it. On the other hand, the
individual steps of the interaction between the program manager and the vVote system
were well explained and could easily be followed. When the audience arrived, the desktop
computer was already prepared with a digital ballot box. No evidence was given that
the ballot box that would be decrypted was indeed the real ballot box. The mixing and
decryption procedure was initiated by the program manager and consisted of (1) the
launching of the mixing and decryption software on each laptop computer, (2) initiating
the main program on the desktop computer, and (3) retrieving the comma separated
values (CSV) file from the main computer. This CSV file contained the preference from
all decrypted ballots and it was printed to produce paper evidence that would be inserted
into the manual count. It should be mentioned that the audience was not informed about
the larger legal framework; the ambition of the ceremony was to achieve technocratic
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and not bureaucratic transparency.
4.3.2 Technocratic framing of transparency
As the vVote system is end-to-end verifiable, the authenticity of the CSV file can be - by
the virtue of a proof of knowledge - established by checking the additional evidence that
was published post election on the internet. End-to-end verifiable systems are designed
to verify the election result and not the process that computed it. This means that
the mixing and decryption ceremony is not strictly necessary for trust generation, but it
contributes to a large extent to the technological understanding of the electorate, if done
right. We notice that the program manager focused the ceremony on explaining how
the vVote system works in general. During his 20 minutes presentation, the program
manager explained the technicalities underlying the vVote system, for example, that
voters received a randomized version of the ballot with a 2D barcode when registering to
vote, that the barcode encrypts the permutation of the voting options and can be used
to decrypt a ballot, and that the ballot itself is a list of numbers in clear text, just not
in the right order. He explained the idea behind cryptographically mixing the ballots,
and executed the mix on a network of the four aforementioned laptops. Although his
presentation was to a large degree independent of the ongoing election and the result,
it made it clear, how the process worked, and, perhaps more importantly, it was an
invitation to check the published proofs of knowledge once they were published on the
web bulletin board. Burton’s presentation of the protocol, together with the availability
of the source code (everything is published on Bitbucket), alleviated the problem of
observability, as the audience was left with the impression that vVote is all mathematics
and implementation, but it also exposed the tremendous complexity behind the vVote
system. Without acknowledging any of the residual trust assumptions, the ceremony
made clear that by design all important parts of the process are voter-verifiable.
4.3.3 Democratic framing of transparency
This decryption ceremony is best described as an early pilot or a proof of concept. This
means it was not designed to cater to a bigger audience and certainly not to create
confidence in the overall election result. But with the democratic framing in mind,
it is exactly here where tremendous opportunities in terms of public trust generation
and public involvement lie. End-to-end verifiable systems depend critically on public
participation and the public checking of cryptographic evidence. Thus, one idea is that
instead of planning a ceremony to explain the process only to a small group of experts,
future editions could explicitly invite scrutineers, stakeholders and press to teach them
about the basic principles of vVote, and to trigger voter verification of the evidence
produced by the system. In Victoria, it is common practice to celebrate democracy and
the election together on Federation Square in downtown Melbourne, where hundreds
of citizen assemble to listen together to the latest prognosis. In 2014, in parallel to
this festival of democracy, the digital votes were mixed and decrypted behind closed
doors. From what was experienced during the ceremony, it is easy to imagine other
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innovative ways on how the ceremony could have also been integrated into the celebration
of democracy that was happening on Federation Square. In summary, the mixing and
decryption ceremony organized by VEC has the potential to contribute to a democratic
framing of transparency.
5 Discussion
We argue that our conceptual framework captures the different ways in which trans-
parency can practically be achieved. The different ‘frames of transparency’ articulate
how different set of features of the electoral process are emphasized. Here, we compare
the different ceremonies and discuss our findings.
In the light of the bureaucratic framing, we observe that e-voting systems call for
additional regulations and structures to organize and control e-enabled elections. The
bureaucratic framing contributes to electoral transparency by providing and making ac-
cessible to a public a clear set of rules, which contribute to build trust in the electoral
system. As we have seen, Norway and Estonia went a long way to regulate and con-
solidate critical aspects of their respective e-voting systems in their legal framework.
These new regulations not only govern e-voting, but also, at least in the case of Estonia,
determined the structure of the e-vote counting ceremony. Furthermore, both countries
formed committees dedicated to the organization and administration of Internet voting.
In Estonia, the committee was put in charge to prepare, organize, and determine the
result of the Internet election while in Norway the committee had much fewer respon-
sibilities but still played a central role during the ceremony. Victoria’s ceremony, on
the other hand, was not subject to a specific regulatory framework, as far as we could
discern.
The technocratic framing helps us to underline how the technical aspects, such as
cleansing, mixing, decryption, counting, and publishing of the results, were foregrounded
during the ceremonies. In Norway and Estonia for example, dedicated overhead screens
(the technical screens) were displaying the command lines executed during the ceremony
and the response of the devices used for e-voting, whether they were the servers that
collected the e-votes or counting servers. We claim, however, that this framing addresses
inherently IT experts and selects a public that is knowledgeable in technical matters.
As far as we understand it, the three ceremonies were organized exclusively by com-
puter scientists (as opposed to civil servants with a legal training) who draw on their
particular background. The efforts they made to demonstrate the process by making
technical and black-boxed and complex procedures visible are significant, but of little
help for members of the audience without an IT background. From the perspective of
the technocratic framing, an important question is to what extent the event convinces
the expert community, and to what extent other people understand the technical aspects
in the ceremony and fulfill their role as free and informed citizens.
At last, the democratic framing of transparency is greatly challenged by the intro-
duction of e-voting systems. These ceremonies bear witness to how the role of the
public in elections is under transformation. The idea of representing the public by proxy
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increasingly appear in the discussions of election observation and intergovernmental or-
ganizations (Barrat, 2012), as well as their expertise seem to play a more dominant
role in overlooking elections and securing the integrity and the legitimacy of an elec-
tion measured by their own standards. When compared to conventional votes counting
processes, it is obvious that the ceremonies makes certain assumptions regarding the
public that are hardly apparent within the bureaucratic and technocratic framing, but
are made visible by the democratic framing. It becomes evident that very few people
are in reality participating in the process in the ceremony and in the Internet election
as a whole. The public in the auditorium are assigned the role of an audience, not as
active participant the way people may involve themselves in conventional voting pro-
cess. The notable exception in Norway was when the audience determined the order in
which the members of the IEC presented their USB sticks. Even if the bureaucratic and
technocratic framings suggest that we can rely on objective procedures and the assess-
ments of technical experts, the democratic framing makes evident that transparency is
not exclusively a question of whether people are knowledgeable, even though this is of
course important. Information is important, but we argue that the active involvement
of citizens in the counting process has been and should continue to be constitutive of
democratic elections.
6 Conclusion
This paper describes how the introduction of e-voting systems furthers and exacerbates
the delegation of the control of the electoral process from the public and the civil servants
to a small group of technical experts. Our depiction of three e-vote counting ceremonies
reveal an overall tendency of mainly framing transparency in technocratic terms, that is
by emphasizing the technical aspects of the respective decryption and counting processes.
The dominance of the technocratic framing comes mostly at the expense of democratic
and to a somewhat lesser extent of the bureaucratic framing and bears witness to a
deep transformation of the electoral process. This begs to question to what extent is
it possible to re-involve the public in e-enabled electoral processes? In their current
form, the ceremonies are designed to cater to a passive audience. However, despite
their actual technocratic bias, we see potential in these ceremonies to re-involve the
participation of the public in the electoral process. In this regard, the most advanced
ceremony was that organized in Victoria, which could be seen as an encouragement for
the public to check their receipts and other published evidence after the official results
were published. Furthermore, we remark that none of the ceremonies attempted to make
explicit the residual trust assumptions that the public has to take for granted in order
to believe the published result.
In this paper we discussed only decryption and counting ceremonies. However, there
are other ceremonies that could be studied as well: a ceremony for creating verifiable
randomness, a ceremony for creating digital ballot forms (if applicable), or a ceremony
for creating and distributing shares of the private election key among the internet voting
committees, to name a few. We believe that our conceptual framework of transparency
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can also be applied here. In particular it would be interesting to study the role of
Benaloh challenges (Benaloh, 2006) in empowering a voter to participate in the election
activities by challenging the validity of a digital ballot using the democratic frame of
transparency.
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